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Abstract
The existing information and researches on the causes, challenges, and solution
on ethnic issues in Nigeria’s post colonial era holds some implications for
creating a reader-centred library collection. This paper focuses on ethnicity in
Nigeria and the challenges of integration and unity and its implications for
reader-centred library collections. Nigeria is the most diverse in terms of ethnic,
linguistic, cultural and religious differences, just as it is the most populous in
Africa. Nigeria embodies all the challenges which ethnic cleavages posed to
post-colonial societies anywhere in the world. The article traces the causes,
challenges and proffer solutions to ethnicity to post-colonial Era. The
implications of this article for creating a reader-centred library collection were
discussed in the context of these expositions. Equipped with the right
information and research outputs, library staff can initiate reading programmes
and services and a varied, appropriate and culturally inclusive collection that
appeal to readers., Given Nigeria’s ethnic cleavages, it is necessary to improve
public library services for culturally diverse communities in Nigeria through a
reader-centred approach.
Key words: Democratization, Ethnicity, Library Collection, Nigeria, Reader
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Introduction
Nigeria as a nation is an aggregation of several nationalities and
therefore, from time immemorial, even before the advent of colonial masters,
ethnic identity have defined the scope of political intercourse in heterogeneous
and pluralistic societies like Nigeria prior to the amalgamation of the entity
nationality such as Ibo, Hausa, Yoruba, Nupe, Tiv, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Jukun, etc
was on its way to nationhood independent of one another but dependent socioeconomic wise, thereby creating a chain of inter-relationships among the people
inhabiting Nigeria today (Ademola, 2000). Many of these are no more than
small insignificant groups that are on the verge of losing their ethnic identities
and being consumed by some of the larger groupings. Three of these larger
groupings, Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba, dominate socio-political life and
between them alternate both political and economic control of the country. This
by no means implies that other smaller groups, the so-called minorities, have no
influence. Far from this supposition, they have considerable clout in many
important socio-political spheres in the country. Many students of Nigerian
politics like to point to the regional concentration of tribes and religion with the
western parts of the country populated by Christians and Yoruba, the eastern
part by Igbo and Christians, and the north by Muslim Hausa Fulani (Badmus,
2009). But the truth is that this is a simplistic portrayal of Nigeria’s ethno
religious boundaries. In reality, none of these regions or parts is ethnoreligiously homogenous. For instance, although mostly populated by the Yoruba
speaking people, the western parts of Nigeria are religiously pluralistic with
elements of Christianity, Islam and traditional religions (Salamone, 1997).
Similarly, in the northern parts of the country while the dominant lingua franca
is Hausa, ethnic and religious diversity is highly pronounced with as many as
over two hundred ethnic groups in the region (Mustapha, 2006). Thus, the
diversity of Nigeria cuts across geographic boundaries.
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The country is an agglomeration of hitherto autonomous and semiautonomous kingdoms, sultanates, emirates, city-states, and even village
republics (Mustapha, 2006). This disparate character was however cobbled
together by the British colonizers through subterfuge, violent pacification and
conquests. The end result of this colonial adventure became by October 1960
known as the independent republic of Nigeria. Even today, it is a subject of
intense and heated debate especially among historians whether without this
colonial influence, Nigeria as we know it today could have emerged. While this
is a difficult question to answer it is really not difficult to see how some of those
societies and communities were in the process of transformation before they
were disrupted by the colonial masters. Dudley (1973) opines that an accurate
description of the British role in the formation and emergence of the Nigerian
state “would be that far from ‘creating’ Nigeria, the boundaries of that
community were delimited by the colonial administration only after the gross
patterns of the indigenous cultural geography had already been established”.
Fage and Alabi (2003) subscribe to this argument that: “due to trade, inter-tribal
marriages, the spread of Islam etc., many of the component ethnic groups in the
country were already in close contact with one another and a measure of unity
and integration was already crystallizing among them”. Oyovbaire (1984)
however rejects the argument of Dudley, because:
Dudley did not provide evidence for the argument, for example, we
are not told which culture was assimilating the others and of the
structures and diffusion or exercise of power (if any) covering the
Nigerian area. In any case, even if the growth of a latent
community could be discerned at the beginning of this century, it is
extremely difficult to argue for it or locate the structures of that
community for the period before the 1880s… The point should be
emphasised that until Britain had established and consolidated its
structures of governance over the contemporary boundaries of the
country from 1914, no ruler or set of rulers, social class or regime
had any claims… over all the pre-colonial state-systems.
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Ikime, (1999) balances this argument thus: “the Sokoto jihad had led to
the establishment of a caliphate made up of fifteen emirates about half the
present day Nigeria. By bringing together such a large area under one political
unit, the jihad paved the way for the emergence of a greater Nigeria”. There is
co-operation, harmony as well as peaceful interaction between them (Usman,
1979). Since colonial Nigeria is created to serve Britain (Maier, 2000), the
political and security structures instituted by the colonizers were concordant
with the British interest and not of the emerging Nigerian state (Ake, 1978).
By 1960 when Nigeria was proclaimed an independent republic, there
was a sufficient basis to appreciate the heterogeneous nature of the country
which made it imperative to adopt constitutional and other institutional
arrangements to ensure inclusiveness while maintaining its corporate existence
as a united republic. The most important of these steps taken and which more
than any other, underscored the ethnic and religious dynamics of the country
was the introduction of federalism and its adoption as a structural system of
government (Osadolor, 2010). Through the decades since independence, it is
remarkable to note that although the character of Nigeria’s federalism has
undergone various forms of changes and alterations, probably to reflect new
political circumstances, the basic federal character of the country remain
essentially unchanged. Thus from the first republic when the country had a
federal system of weak central government and powerful regional government,
today we see a strong central government and weak federating units (Suberu,
2001).
In terms of political and economic distribution of values, few
observations could be made here. The first important observation is that in order
to accommodate Nigeria's diverse nature, the principle of federal character is
introduced to guard against marginalization of some ethnic groups in all federal
establishments while ensuring equitable representation (Suberu, 2001). Another
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of the informal safeguard adopted was an informal form of elite consensus that
allows power to rotate among the regions. Thus, since 1999 when the fourth
republic was inaugurated, the office of the president has alternated between the
so-called Muslim north and the so-called Christian south.
Notwithstanding these formal and informal arrangements, the country
remains entangled in dangerous waves of ethno-religious and sectarian strife
(Badmus, 2009). Beginning with the January 1966 Igbo executed military coup
in which practically all those killed were top military and political leaders from
the northern parts of the country, the Isaac Boro secession attempt, to the July
1966 counter coup in which officers mainly from the north avenged the January
coup, to the violent civil war that lasted thirty months and cost nearly two
million lives, the socio political history of Nigeria is full of sectarian
antagonism, suspicion and violence. Today, some fifty years after
independence, sectarian cleavages have remained very much part of the major
challenges facing the progress, peace and stability of the country. So wide are
the feelings of alienation, marginalization and antagonism among these ethnic
groups that today calls for dismembering of Nigeria are never more louder and
strident. Accusations and counter accusations, killings and reprisal killings have
remained some of the hallmark of Nigerian state these last fifty years.
Ethnicity therefore has become a strong factor in the political life of
Nigeria. Most often ethnic sentiments are used to replace merit and skills, such
that round pegs are no longer found in round holes. This chauvinistic behavior
affects the efficiency and productivity of Nigeria. Nonetheless, is fundamental
to inquire where this, feeling of “we and they” notion came from. When did
Nigerians start feelings that the other person does not belong to his enclave or
he is better than the other group or ethnic? It seems ethnicity was a colonial
heritage bequeathed to Nigeria at independence by the colonial masters. In
effect, whatever damage ethnicity has generated in the process of governing
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Nigeria it could be trace to colonial arrangement. The major objectives of this
paper are to carefully trace the causes, challenges and proffer solution to
ethnicity in post colonial era in Nigeria.
Ethnicity
The concept ethnicity and tribalism has always been a confused matter.
Some scholars use the two concepts as though they carry the some meaning and
strongly inseparable. However, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference
between ethnicity and tribalism even though the difference is water-tight. Nnoli
(1978) for instance sees ethnicity as a:
Social phenomenon associated with the identity of members of the
largest possible competing communal groups (ethnic groups)
seeking to protect and advance their interest in a political system.
The relevant communal factor may be language, culture, race
religion and/or common history. Ethnicity is only one of the
phenomena associated with interactions among communal groups
(ethnic groups). Others include trade, diplomacy, friendship
enmity, corporation, self-abnegation and self extension. What is
peculiar to ethnicity is that it involves demands by one group on
other competing groups.
From the definition above by Nnoli, ethnicity exists where the communal
groups comprise either of: language, culture, race, religion or common history.
If we go by Nnoli’s position, tribalism which has to do with a tribe is only an
element that could constitute ethnicity hence ethnicity in this case is wider in
context than tribalism. Ethnicity in the words of Nnoli above shows that it does
not yet exist until a demand is made by one group to seek for advantage and
benefits for its group relative to what another group is seemingly enjoying. In
support of this argument of the difference between ethnicity and tribalism,
Eteng (2004) says that: An ethnic group, however, is not necessarily
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linguistically or culturally, homogeneous, insofar as it often subsumes subcultural, linguistic, dialectic occupational and class differences, depending on
the prevailing level of socio-economic development and cultural differentiation.
Similarly, according to Thomson (2000) a basic definition of ethnicity is a
community of people who have the conviction that they have a common identity
and common fate based on issues of origin, kinship, ties, traditions, cultural
uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a shared language. In this sense, an
ethnic group is much like the imagined community of the nation. Ethnicity,
however, focuses more on sentiments of origin and descent, rather than the
geographical considerations of a nation.
From the definition above, ethnicity obvious is a smaller community
found within a larger society which of cause is the implication of Thomson “…
imagined community of the nation”. So, it has to do with a unique group
behavior seeking for favor restrictive to its group members. Ethnicity involves
the display of sentiments in bias to a special set of group one belongs to. In
concord to the foregoing, Omu (1996) says that ethnicity applies to the
consciousness of belonging to, identifying with, and being loyal to a social
group distinguished by shared cultural traditions, a common language, in-group
sentiment and self-identity.
On the whole, ethnicity has to do with a unique group with distinct and
peculiar features which are sources of common ties on which the feeling of
sentiment and emotion is being expressed in protest or support of an action
taken against or in favor of such a group. In sum, ethnicity is the deliberate and
consciousness of tracing of one’s identity to a particular ethnic group and
allowing such feeling to determine the way one relates with people and things,
ethnicity creates the brackets of ‘we’ ‘they’ ‘ours’, ‘theirs’ feeling. Ethnicity
makes it very difficult for different ethnic groups to agree on anything.
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Post Colonial Era
Post Colonial Era refers to the historical period or state of affairs
representing the aftermath of Western colonialism; the term can also be used to
describe the concurrent project to reclaim and rethink the history and agency of
people subordinated under various forms of imperialism. Post colonial era
signals a possible future of overcoming colonialism, yet new forms of
domination or subordination can come in the wake of such changes, including
new forms of global empire. Post colonial era should not be confused with the
claim that the world we live in now is actually devoid of colonialism. The term
Post colonial era is also sometimes used to refer to the struggles of indigenous
peoples in many parts of the world in the early 21st century. However, given the
interpretation of the principles of self-determination and self-government within
the international system, along with the minority status and vulnerability of
those peoples even within decolonized states, the term is perhaps less apt.
The years between 1952 and 1966 brought changes in the political culture
of Nigeria, transforming the three regions into three political entities. Thus, the
struggle for independence was reduced to the quest for ethnic dominance. At
this time, ethnic and sub-ethnic loyalties threatened the survival of both East
and West while the North was divided religiously into Christianity and Islam. It
was a period of politicized ethnicity and competition for resources, which
worsened the relationship between ethnic groups. There was a high degree of
corruption, nepotism and tribalism. The national interest was put aside while
politicians used public money to build and maintain patronage networks. Since
independence, the situation in Nigeria has been fraught with ethnic politics
whereby the elite from different ethnic groups schemed to attract as many
federal resources to their regions as possible, neglecting issues that could have
united the country.

8

Causes of ethnicity cleavages in post colonial era of Nigeria
John Paden in his biography of the Late Ahmadu Bello, the first Premier
of the Northern region narrated a conversation between the late Ahmadu Bello
and Nnamdi Azikwe, Nigeria’s first president, sometime after independence.
Paden narrated that Azikwe approached Bello and said to him “let us forget our
differences so that we can make Nigeria great”. To this, Bello responded by
saying “No, let us understand our differences: you are a Southerner and a
Christian, and I am a Northerner and a Muslim. By understanding our
differences we can make Nigeria great” (Paden, 1986). This exchange between
the leaders of the two dominant political parties in the country after
independence was instructive in two ways. First, it revealed the level of anxiety
among the political class for the unity, progress, and development of the
country. Secondly, it revealed in the strongest sense possible the challenges of
diversity which the country contended with since its infancy, and which were
crucial then, as they are today, towards forging the required tolerance and
understanding necessary for nation-building, progress and development.
The first days of independence were in this regard crucial. The newly
independent country faced quite a number of important challenges. At the
domestic front, the challenges were mainly political and economic. There were
the challenges of consolidating the gains of independence and launching the
country on the pedestal of political stability and economic development. To
achieve these, there was the need to address issues that were left unresolved by
the departing colonial masters. The most important of these issues concerned
finding a pragmatic and agreeable solution to the simmering minority problem
in the Delta region. This problem that first came to the official attention of the
colonial masters in the 1950s was not effectively addressed before
independence (Badmus, 2009). Another important issue was designing a
mechanism that would ensure equitable representation of the regions in all
federal appointments. The third, and probably the most important issue was how
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to bridge the wide educational gap between the predominantly Christian south
and the predominantly Muslim northern parts of the country (Mustapha, 2006).
Lagging behind in terms of educational development, the northern region
appeared in the colonial days not particularly keen on independence out of fear
of domination by the educationally more developed southern region. There were
also issues related to the vast size and large population of the northern region
that put it ahead of the two other regions in terms of federal constituencies. This
gave it an edge in control of political power at the federal level.
Attempts were made at various times especially in the early days of the
first republic to address some of these challenges. A fourth region, Mid-West,
later created out of the Eastern and Western regions by the federal government
in a move to allay the fears of the Delta minorities. Again, in its early days,
there was an indication that a federal character was adopted as the guiding
principle in all appointments into the federal service to ensure that none of the
regions had more placements than the others (Suberu, 2001). This was meant to
ensure equitable distribution of administrative and other career appointments in
the federal public service.
Problems that could not however readily be addressed through formal
institutional mechanisms especially fierce elite competition and rivalry were in
effect responsible for most of the failure to build enduring institutions that
would promote and sustain national integration (Nicholas & Ford, 2007). One
dominant feature of all heterogeneous democracies in the post-colonial period
was that politics were not issue-driven. Probably, this was because they were as
yet to develop the necessary counter-balancing forces and institutions to ethnic
and sectional politics. In any case, these societies pursued what could be
described as ethnic and sectional-driven politics in which resort was always
made to primordial sentiments to garner cheap political support. In this kind of
political space, politics is not defined in terms of what people could get out of
their leaders, but rather is seen as a vast field that is sharply divided and fitted
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neatly into ethnic dichotomy of “us” against “them”. The “them” usually in this
case defined as other rival ethnic groups in the polity. Nigeria, from its early
days, was dodged by this kind of sectarian-view of politics where the political
elites, with the exception of very few progressives, defined it as a struggle for
dominance and hegemony between “them” and the “others”. Because of this
dangerous competition for power among the political elites, politics soon went
out of control and political interaction became characterized by friction and
ethnic antagonism between the various ethnic groups constituting the federation
(Mustapha, 2006).
January and July coup d’états of 1966
The low point of this transformation was the January 15, 1966 violent
coup d’état in which killings of political and military leaders took clearly ethnic
and regional lines. On 15th of January 1966, the country woke up to a martial
music claiming that the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa led government had been
overthrown by the armed forces of the federation. It later transpired that the
coup was tribally inspired (Salamone, 1997). Practically the entire top political
and military class from the northern region including the prime minister and the
premier of the northern region, and some top political and military leaders from
western region considered too close to the NPC led federal government, were
either killed in front of their families or abducted and brutally gunned down by
the plotters mostly from the eastern region. It also transpired that in the 15th
January rampage in which senior military leaders were killed, none of the
victims were Igbos from the eastern region. The government that emerged in the
aftermath of the coup under Major General A. Ironsi, an Igbo officer from
Eastern Nigeria, one of those officers who “miraculously” escaped the coup
plotters, pursued policies and programs that further reinforced the view that the
coup was designed and hatched as part of an ethnic agenda to cripple the north
of its political and military leadership in the federation. The most notorious of
those policies was the introduction of Decree 34 which centralized public
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administration of the country (Salamone, 1997). In a country which practiced
federalism, and with a region which was suspicious of the government, and
even at the best of circumstances was suspicious of any move aimed at
centralization owing to its backwardness in education, this decree triggered
massive protests and backlash against the Igbo residents in the region.
Another problem that erupted at this time was the Niger-Delta secession
and its declaration of independence under Isaac A. Boro. It has been already
noted how the failure of the colonial government to address the minorities’
problem left boiling beneath the political surface, anger, feelings of
marginalization, and frustrations. The collapse of the first republic proved to be
the linchpin that triggered the eruption of the Boro rebellion in 1966. Although
it was promptly quashed by the military, repeated failure by successive
administrations in the country led it to become one of those sore points
betraying the huge cleavage of the Nigerian federation. By July 1966, Ironsi’s
failure to prosecute the plotters of the January coup, and the corresponding
ascendance of Igbos in all top administrative and political positions in the
country, led to a violent counter-coup organized by a section of the northern
officers. In this counter-coup, Ironsi himself lost his life and scores of other
military officers mostly Igbos were killed.
The civil war: 1967-1970 and beyond
On March 1967 the first shot was fired across the Niger Bridge heralding
the commencement of an avoidable human catastrophe which is known in
Nigerian history as the civil war. A month before that fateful day, the eastern
region under the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu seceded from the Nigerian
federation and declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra (De St. Jorre,
1975). The civil war lasted exactly thirty months and its cost in terms of human
lives was estimated to be around two million (Diamond, 2007). The events that
preceded the civil war have been given various interpretations. The most
accurate however was that the conflict could have been avoided if not for the
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ego and uncompromising stance of Odumegu Ojukwu, the Igbo military
governor of the eastern region, and later the rebel chief and leader of Biafra. At
a time when national understanding and reconciliation was needed, Ojukwu
assumed moral higher horse and refused to either accept the leadership of
General Gowon or the twelve state structure proposed by the federal military
government (Garba, 1982). It was true in the July counter-coup Igbos, his
kinsmen, were killed, but it was also true that in the January coup, northerners
were killed. The irony of the situation was that Ojukwu accepted the killings of
January, even if unfortunate, but rejected the killings of his kinsmen in July as
totally unwarranted and unjustified.
In any case what is clear is that a war was fought among Nigerians that
lasted thirty months. The war, its causes, how it was fought, how it was ended,
and the ensuing peace, has become a classic case study on the challenges of
unity and integration posed by ethnic and sectarian cleavages in Africa. After
the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of the Biafran forces in January
1970, the federal government in a remarkably magnanimous gesture declared a
policy of “no victor, no vanquished”. Igbos who fled the country during the war
were reinstated in their former positions, and abandoned properties were
inventoried and compensations paid by the federal government. It is remarkable
that less than a decade later, an Igbo was able to emerge a vice president of the
country in a democratically conducted election.
From 1970 when the civil war ended to 1999 when the present fourth
republic was inaugurated, Nigeria had contended with other low-key conflicts
and crises that once again brought to the fore, the unresolved nature of ethnic
cleavages in the country (Uwazurike, 1997). While many of these were low-key
and basically had economic antecedents such as the Fulani-Sayawa crisis in
Tafawa Balewa in 1988, the Zangon Kataf Hausa/Fulani-Kataf crisis of 1991.
The fact remained that repeated failure by successive administrations in most
cases to address structural and systemic injustices contributed more than any
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other factor in fuelling these antagonisms. For example, the Niger-Delta crisis
which assumed an international dimension in the 1990s under the Abacha
regime could appropriately be considered as fuelled by struggle for economic
and environmental justice before it became hijacked in the 2000s by criminal
elements (Badmus, 2009). Between the end of the war, the collapse of the
second and ill-fated third republics, and the restoration of democracy in 1999,
the most serious of all the challenges to national unity however remained the
June 12 saga (Uwazurike, 1997; Salamone, 1997). The annulment of the June
12 presidential elections won by Chief MKO Abiola by the Babangida military
administration triggered a sectional backlash from the western part of Nigeria
where Abiola hailed from. Suspecting that the annulment by Babangida, a
northerner, was calculated to deprive the Yoruba their “turn” to enjoy the
“national cake”, the Yoruba commenced systematic and organized campaigns
aimed at undermining Nigerian unity and its peaceful co-existence. So virulent
were the campaigns in those days that bombs and political assassinations were
introduced for the first time into the political discourse of the country.
Democratization in 1999 and beyond
Often it is said that the British and other colonial powers paid little
attention to ethnic and religious homogeneity when drawing the boundaries of
new states in Africa; a situation which it is believed by many not only saw
arbitrary boundaries but also fusion of different cultures, values, norms, and
religions in incompatible agglomerations (Yoon, 2009). Ordinarily, these kinds
of creations ought not to be problematic at all, for sufficient evidences do exists
from other climes that have been able to accommodate these forces and forge
the required national spirit. Problems, we note, begin with the kind of political
institutions, political

values, and

political class

that

emerged after

decolonization (Ake, 1978). The greatest culpability of colonialism in this
regard however lies in the creation of a peculiar political class in Africa whose
sole motive for pursuing power is political aggrandizement. This political class
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has been wholly responsible nearly for all the woes that befall most African
countries since independence. In Nigeria, the political class was at the center of
truncating all efforts designed to forge national cohesion and progress.
The death of Abacha in June 1997 and that of Abiola a little later
mercifully allowed for breath of fresh air in the political space. This meant that
the country could move away from the belligerent posture of Abacha, and the
difficulty of deciding what to do with Abiola’s mandate, towards a new
democratic transition program (Egwaikhide & Isumonah, 2001). Through some
form of informal elite consensus that had served the country often well in
difficult times, it was resolved that the presidency would go to the south west,
the region from where Abiola hailed. This informal consensus, known in the
Nigerian parlance as “power rotation” was intended to be a goodwill gesture of
national reconciliation with the militant Yoruba who had since the annulment of
June 12 assumed a rebellious posture towards the federation (Uwazurike, 1997).
In this sense, all the candidates that contested for the office of the president
were Yoruba with their running mates from other ethnic groups.
That was not enough to, however, calm the various ethnic groups who
rightly or wrongly felt excluded from the “national cake”. While the Yoruba
were pacified with one of their “own” as president, other ethnic groups took up
the belligerence. In fact, it appeared like ethnic and sectarian tendencies were
waiting for the military to depart from the corridors of power before they
exploded practically in all parts of the country. It could be said that unlike other
climes where democracy comes with incentives for reconciliation and national
healing such as South Africa, in Nigeria it opened the floodgates of sectarian
conflicts, inter and intra-communal violence and counter-violence so much that
it is believed that the lives lost to sectarian killings and violence since 1999
where greater than all the lives lost in all forms of sectarian conflicts before
1999 excepting the civil war (Badmus, 2009). Beginning with the south west
where the infamous militant organization, OPC, went on a killing spree of
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Hausa-Fulani traders residing there, to the Sharia riots in the north where both
Muslims and Christians were maimed and killed, it appeared as if the country
was on a match to self-destruction (Mustapha, 2006).
In the Niger-Delta region youths formed militant organizations and
started destroying oil pipelines, disrupting production and supply, killing
security personnel, and abducting expatriate oil workers in the region. In the
north central part of the country, neighbors who have lived together for
generations suddenly found reasons to kill each other (Badmus, 2009). Starting
with the Tiv against the Jukuns to the most persisting in Plateau state where a
dangerous dichotomy was created between the “indigenous” population and the
“settlers”. Today, sectarian violence in Plateau state has remained one of the
most endemic of all forms of ethnic cleavages in the country.
One other dimension to this cleavage though not really tribally-induced
but has significance on the question of national unity of Nigeria are the Boko
Haram activities since 2009. Boko Haram originally started as a peaceful, albeit
with a literalist orientation, Islamic sect around 2002. Unprovoked violence that
included massacres, rape, and destruction of their properties by federal security
agencies, however, transformed them into the most deadly threat to Nigeria’s
peace and unity today. Based in the north eastern part of Nigeria, the group
espoused a puritanical version of Islam modeled on the Wahabi teachings and
Taliban orientation. Part of their stated mission is to abolish all forms of western
education, abrogation of the constitution and democracy. In a multi-religious
country such as Nigeria where the constitution upholds the principle of
secularism this no doubt is a dangerous mission (Sani, 2011). The greatest
danger posed by the group, however, is in how it kills its perceived enemies and
anyone who disagrees with its teachings whether Muslim or Christian
(Stroehlein, 2012). In their attacks which usually relied on suicide bombings
and targeted assassinations, they often make no distinction between a mosque
and a church.
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Other causes of ethnicity that need to be pointed here include the nature
of the political elite and the national leadership (Badmus, 2009). While the
former cares less about the unity of the country and more about its continuing
relevance in the politics of the country, the inept and weak nature of the latter
merely exacerbates the tense situation in the country today. No less dangerous is
the belligerent attitude of the president’s kinsmen who hails from Niger-Delta.
Ever since the president assumed leadership, his kinsmen are behaving as if he
is an ethnic president rather than a national president. This same cavalier
attitude was evident among the Yoruba when Obasanjo was the president
especially in his first term. Thus, the picture of Nigeria today can be presented
as fractured than ever before in its political history. Already strident calls for
sovereign national conference, a euphemism for dismembering the country, are
getting louder and louder by the day. However, this should not be construed as
meaning that there is no silver lining in the horizon. Far from that, there are
indications that show that the mass of the people have started exhibiting the
necessary awareness about the implications of ethnicity to their well-being. The
most remarkable as well as recent was the oil subsidy protests in many parts of
the country in January 2012. For once, it seems that Nigerians forgot about their
ethnic and religious differences when they confronted the federal government
over its decision to increase the price of fuel in the country. People from
different religious and ethnic groups embraced each other and united in their
opposition to the policy.
Challenges of ethnicity in post colonial era of Nigeria
The aggravation of ethnic identity after independence in Nigeria was due
to the lopsided federal structure which eventually implicated on the violent
ethno-political discontent prevalent during the post-colonial Nigeria. Indeed the
incessant disenchantment and frustrations of the ethnic minority under the
federal structure accounted for the Tiv riot 1962 1964 the secessionist campaign
of Isaac Adako Boro and his Ijaw group. Other ethno-regional conflicts were
17

also expressed through the Census crisis of 1963/63, 1964 federal election,
sectional military intervention and the counter coup of 1966. Rather than the
lopsided structure of the Nigerian federalism to be restructured by addressing
the minority question through the creation of sub-federal regional units, the
crisis of the federation was deepen with unification decree leading to the
attempted secessions of the Biafra republic and the eventual outbreak of 30
month civil war. The aftermath of the civil war was the relative period of peace
and stability for the country in terms of ethnic conflict.
The stability was a measure of transformation of the federation into a
horizontally balanced union. The dissolution of the four region into twelve state
and nineteen respectively, the use of oil revenue to douse inter-group resource
conflict

through

ethno-distributive

measures,

including

(provision

of

infrastructure in the new state administrative capital and the expansion of the
general distributive pool account (DPA) under the revenue allocation system)
and innovative statutory mechanism of ethnic conflict accommodation (federal
character principle and the interregional distribution requirement for the election
of the federal republic). In spite of the measure of stability during this period, it
was still mark by semblance of sectional tension as dispute over 1973 and 1975
killing of the head of state was the flash point. However, the relative peace and
stability enjoyed during the period was broken by the Maitatsine which claimed
lot of lives and the Kafanchan-Kaduna ethno-religious crisis which reawaken
the age long Muslim and non-Muslim tension in the North. The Nigeria military
as a stabilizing force to the manifestation of ethnic nationalism were able to
curtailed and bottle up the aggravated ethno-religious and regional diversities in
the country between 1983-1999, suppressing the diverse tendencies and
maintain the corporate existence of the country through creation of more states
and review in revenue allocation formula as well as the sub-regional creation of
the six geographical zone.
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The military however were not immune from the ethno-nationalist
aggravation which has remained a dominant factor in Nigeria politics (Duruji,
2010). The perception of some section of the society is that the military is
serving the interest of the Hausa- Fulani major ethnic group since they dominate
the military institution of Nigeria exercising hegemony over its major
institutional structure of the security apparatus of the state (Fatai, 2012). This
has further exploded and increased contemporary ethnic tension and identity
relation in Nigeria.
Fatai (2012) believed that the emergence of democracy in 1999 opened
up the democratic space for ethnic expression and transformation which hitherto
had been bottled up by the Military and authoritarian regime before 1999
Nigeria. One of the most appealing aspects of democracy as a system of
governance is the expendable system of rights that must be guaranteed, even
though it brings with it its peculiar sets of problem (Duruji, 2010) The peculiar
problem becomes more obvious in a multicultural compositional society
because while managing identities problem in a multi-ethnic society poses a
challenge, the truth however is that democracy offers opportunities for groups to
express their feelings and putting their demand across to the state irrespective of
their diversities. By this democracy is seen as the instrumentality for addressing
monopolization of power by 'single ethnic group' or a 'group of ethnic groups' in
the country as well as the restoration of political stability in a multi-ethnic
society. The Hausa-Fulani hegemony and the marginalization of other ethnic
group during the military era was the issue that dominates the national political
discourse prior to 1999. Of the 50 years rule, the military had rule for 29years
and the Hausa-Fulani ethnic extraction has, had more benefit from the federal
power at the expense of other ethnic groups.
The tactical alienation of the Igbo in the federal power on account of their
suspicion after the Biafra attempt at secession by the federal government had
continue to be a source of agitation on the part of the Ibo major ethnic group.
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More generally the North/South divide shows a picture of a marginalized south
given the control of the political machinery of the state by the North over a long
period of time: for instance the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election
acclaimed to have been won by MKO Abiola believed to be Yoruba's
opportunity for the presidency also raises issues on the deliberate scheme of the
Hausa-Fulani major ethnic group to hold on to power at the expense of other
major ethnic group. The event of 1993-94 must be seen in the context of an
enduring pattern of ethnic antagonism and inequality where the Hausa-Fulani is
perceived as 'other' (Adebanwi, 2004). Duruji (2010) asserted that this situation
is a negation of democracy which gives equal opportunity for political
contestants without restricting anyone. This view goes to argued that democracy
is not a panacea for resolving ethnic contestation, for democracy will be
undermine in a multi-ethnic society where majority interest are as important as
those of the minority interest. The democratic opening therefore provides the
platform and space for the resurgence of long- repressed demand for the
restructuring of the Nigeria federation on a more equitable basis and calling to
question the domination of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony.
The emergence of ethnic militant organization was another challenge
seen as platform for bringing into the open complaints that were previously
mouthed with hushed tones, thanks to the transition to democracy (Ubani,
2006). The manifestation of insurgencies in the name of ethnic militia such as
Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) Arewa People's
Congress (APC) (While the first two were keen on the restructuring of the
Nigerian federation (based on the outcome of sovereign national conference) to
allow

for autonomy, self-determination, resource control

and

social

emancipation (Fatai, 2012), the third APC is keen on maintaining the status quo
and preventing the marginalization of the North. The impoverish condition due
to the neglect and marginalization of the Niger-delta region where the country
major resources-oil is been generated has also spiraled minority ethnic militant
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groupings, such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC)-which arose from the Ijaw
National Congress), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta
(MEND) which arose from the Niger-Delta Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the
Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC). These militant groups
predicated their struggle on resource control and regional political autonomy.
The phase of their struggle has however changed with time as their struggle
against the Multinational Corporation later change to targeting the state and its
national heritage. Apart from the prevalence of ethnic militant, there was also
flashpoint of sectarian and communal clashes. Hardly as the democratic
government settled down that Ijaw/Itsekiri clashes exploded, Ife/Modakeke,
Kaduna and Jos were all evidence of communal and identity clashes in 1999.
These crises were further compounded by the Sharia crisis in the North,
pitching the Christians against the Muslims and put to test the secularity of the
Nigerian state (Obi, 2000). As Obi suggested, Nigerian democratic space is
hotly contested terrain, which partly feeds into the interrogation of the
hegemonic nation state project and the escalation of violent conflict across the
country.
While some of these ethnic group have been appeased with innovative
federal principles such principle of derivation (13percent as in the case of the
Niger-delta state, Development Commissions and Amnesty) and power sharing
quota system to foster equitable distribution and opportunity among diversities
in the country, the government has sustained a long pattern of repression of
local resistance demanding for autonomy, by unleashing the might of the state
to suppress these ethno-nationalist manifestations. The incidence of Odi
Massacre, Zaki-biam, Onitsha Gbaramutu Nigerian troops raze down the town
in a manner not conformities with rule of law, were indicative of the repressive
tendencies of ethnic agitation by the state. The story is not different in the South
East were the agitations of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is getting
stronger and violent each day. More recently is the clash between Fulani
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herdsmen and farmers in villages in Agatu Local Government of Benue State
where over 300 persons were confirmed. These ethnic conflicts have heightened
the feeling of miss giving between the masses and select political class. A
scenario were citizens of the country are feeling left out and out of touch with
the goings and policy direction of the country. This situation calls for a
democratic system that encourages participation of its citizenry in issues of
governance.
Solution to ethnicity in Nigeria
Years before the attainment of independence, Nigeria’s constitutional
development experiences were concerned with the principal goal of managing
ethnicity, which had shown clear signs of subverting the nation-building project.
Federalism, the creation of regions and states and local governments, the shift
from parliamentarism to presidentialism, the institutionalization of quota
systems, the prohibition of ethnic political parties, consociational politicking,
and the adoption of the federal character principle are some of the approaches
that Nigeria has taken to manage ethnic diversity. These mechanisms have
enjoyed the intellectual backing of institutionalists who posit that there is a
connection between ethnic conflict or peace and the nature of political
institutions (Young 1976, Horowitz 1985). Several works on ethnicity in
Nigeria have been committed to examining the impact of these approaches to
the management of ethnicity (Ekeh & Osaghae, 1989, Adamolekun, 1991;
Ekekwe, 1986). Nigerians should aim at operating a true federalism, cultivate a
suitable political culture, out-grow ethnic rancor and stop blaming ethnicity for
any social policy that affects a group unintentionally.
Implications for Reader-centred Library Collections
The existing information and researches on the causes, challenges, and
solution on the ethnicity issues in Nigeria’s post colonial era holds some
implications for creating a reader-centred library collection. Equipped with the
right information and research outputs, library staff can initiate reading
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programmes and services and a varied, appropriate and culturally inclusive
collection that appeal to readers. An efficient library team would plan,
implement and evaluate programmes and services aimed at developing and
sustaining readers’ literacy skills and enthusiasm for reading (National Library
of New Zealand, n.d). Through collaboration with other staff, the library team
can support individual learning as well as organization's vision and strategic
goals. Nigeria is a culturally diverse nation. It is necessary to improve public
library services for culturally diverse communities in Nigeria through a readercentred approach.
Conclusion
From the literature reviewed it is clear that Nigeria as a nation is riddled
with a lot of ethnic conflicts. These conflicts results because of the religion and
cultural diversity amongst are people. The paper opined that these conflicts
results because of a feeling of marginalization by some ethnic groups. The paper
argued that ethnic conflicts is prominent in Nigeria's political sphere because
many citizens do not participate in the political process and policy formulation
process of the country, so they appear to be left out on the scheme of things. The
implications of this article for creating a reader-centred library collection cannot
be overstated.
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